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A B S T R A C T 
Infrastructure as a Service clouds are a flexible and fast way to obtain (virtual) resources as demand 
varies. Grids, on the other hand, are middleware platforms able to combine resources from different 
administrative domains for task execution. Clouds can be used by grids as providers of devices such as 
virtual machines, so they only use the resources they need. But this requires grids to be able to decide 
when to allocate and reléase those resources. Here we introduce and analyze by simulations an economic 
mechanism (a) to set resource prices and (b) resolve when to scale resources depending on the users' 
demand. This system has a strong emphasis on fairness, so no user hinders the execution of other users' 
tasks by getting too many resources. 
Our simulator is based on the well-known GridSim software for grid simulation, which we expand 
to simúlate infrastructure clouds. The results show how the proposed system can successfully adapt the 
amount of allocated resources to the demand, while at the same time ensuring that resources are fairly 
shared among users. 
1. Introduction 
The term cloud [1] is applied to systems that allow to exter-
nalize the provisión and management of computing resources. 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) clouds supply virtual physical re-
sources such as virtual machines (VMs). They are arguably the most 
well-known cloud type, and there are already several commer-
cial offerings that provide such remote infrastructure services, e.g. 
Amazon EC21 or Rackspace.2 The main feature of these cloud sys-
tems3 is their ability to quickly supply virtual resources on de-
mand, in commercial settings under a pay-per-use billing policy. 
Afterward, users can reléase those resources as soon as they do 
not need them. This way, users can handle peaks on capacity de-
mand without incurring in resource overprovision. This character-
istic is denoted as scalability and is getting a lot of attention from 
the research community [2]. Also, clouds provide a high degree of 
flexibility as each VM can use its own software stack. Henee, it is 
possible to run in the same physical host different applications 
even if they have conflicting software needs. 
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From now on, the term cloud will be used to denote IaaS clouds. 
Grid systems, on the other hand, are a well-known technology 
that can provide a seemingly unique infrastructure from several 
resource providers, possibly heterogeneous. Typically, grid users 
send their tasks to the grid platform which will distribute them 
among the resources available. Activities such as resource location, 
execution scheduling, security handling, etc. are managed by the 
grid. 
Grids can use clouds as infrastructure providers so they can 
deploy or reléase resources in order to react to changes on demand, 
or to anticípate to variations on that demand if load prediction 
systems (like [3]) are available. This demand of resources will be 
induced by the amount (which depends on the triggering rate) 
and size of tasks sent to the grid. Thus, grids will be able to 
allocate only the infrastructure they require. Besides, grids can 
benefit from clouds flexibility as they will be able to run tasks 
with heterogeneous software requirements in the same host. We 
deem this is of special interest in some typical grid usage scenarios 
where several users compete for resources which are freely (in 
monetary terms) available, but are also limited. Examples of such 
scenarios are several scientific environments, where resources can 
be provided by one or several entities. This proposal is mainly 
oriented to that kind of setups. 
However, this brings a new problem: how can grids decide 
when to scale up or down resources? For example, a grid system 
could decide to enqueue incoming tasks, or even to reject them, 
instead of allocating new resources. Henee, it seems reasonable 
that users should be able to point out if their tasks have a certain 
priority so they should be run as soon as possible, instead of being 
enqueued or discarded. 
Here we propose an economic mechanism to enable grids 
to decide how to scale resources. A price is computed for each 
resource, so the cost of running each task can be calculated. These 
prices are adapted depending on the demand. Users have a limited, 
periodically renewed budget to run their tasks. Negotiation follows 
a tender/'contract-net model [4] where users ask for offers for each 
task they want to run and choose the most suitable one following 
a utility function also defined by them. The tender/contract-net 
model is known to be the economic model that optimizes users' 
utility [5], which is the main goal in the scenarios we address. 
Also, as no user can demand too many resources due to budget 
restrictions, no user can get a unfair share of those resources. 
Tasks have a deadline, so those that could not be run (not suitable 
offer was received) before their deadline expires will be marked as 
failed. 
The main contribution of this work is the introduction of a 
hybrid grid-cloud architecture where one or more clouds provide 
infrastructure resources and the grid: 
• Automatically scales resources usage to attend a variable de-
mand to run tasks with possibly heterogeneous software needs. 
• Splits resources fairly among users. Here, fair does not mean 
equally. Maybe some users need more resources than others, 
and those should be granted while there are enough resources 
for all. 
In the presented architecture the grid system is not in charge of 
ordering users' tasks, which are processed following a FIFO policy. 
We assume instead that each user is the one who must prioritize 
her tasks following her own criteria, i.e.: the user is the one to de-
cide which is the next task to execute. A tasks ordering mechanism 
for users is also proposed in this work, based not only on the pri-
ority assigned to each task by the user, but also on the risk of not 
being able to run that task which is computed using its size and the 
time to its deadline. This mechanism shows a better outcome than 
ordering tasks using only their priority. It is applied in the subse-
quent experiments to simúlate a realistic dynamic market where 
users implement complex task management strategies. 
We test and evalúate this proposal by simulations run using 
the GridSim [6] simulator, whose features we extended in order 
to suit the requirements of our experiments. Experiments are run 
over a hybrid architecture that combines a grid system with IaaS 
clouds. The grid system used as basis of this architecture is DIET [7]. 
In [8] Carón et al. introduce and discuss a first proposal of the 
architecture presented here. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 details 
the architecture proposed; Section 3 explains how the system 
market approach is implemented, i.e. how currency flows, how 
offers for each task request are computed, how prices are adapted, 
etc.; Section 4 shows the results of some simulations that test 
key features of the proposed system; Section 5 presents an 
analysis of related work in the área of clouds and economy-based 
grid systems; finally Section 6 discusses the conclusions of the 
work presented. The extensions proposed to GridSim, which were 
the base for the simulations presented in Section 4 are briefly 
explained in Appendix. 
2. Grid-cloud architecture 
The solution proposed in this paper combines a hierarchical grid 
system, DIET, with several clouds that will provide resources to the 
grid. To describe this solution we need first to outline how DIET 
works. 
DIET [7] connects its components through a hierarchical tree 
for scalability. The basic DIET component is the Agent. Agents 
have scheduling and data management capabilities, but here 
we will focus on their primary and most basic functionality: 
service location. Fig. 1 depicts DIET components organization. 
Each DIET grid has a unique Master Agent (MA) on the top of its 
hierarchy. This MA gets service requests from users. Each request 
(0) The user issues a new task request to the Master Agent. 
(1) The user task is forwarded down through DIET hierarchy. 
(2) Finally the request reaches the SeDs at the bottom. 
(3) The SeD buids an answer, taking into account its own 
capacity. It forwards it to the parent Local Agent. 
(4) A list of SeDs able to fulfill the request Offers is sent back 
through the hierarchy to the Master Agent who forwards it 
to the user. That list is ordered by SeDs' capacities. 
(5) User chooses the best SeD and sends it the task. 
Fig. 1. DIET hierarchical layout. 
goes down through the hierarchy formed by the agents until it 
reaches the Server Daemons (SeD), that interact with the execution 
environments and provide the actual execution services. Each 
Agent knows the services that can be executed by the SeDs at the 
bottom of each one of its children Agents, and it will not forward 
service requests to those Agents whose corresponding SeDs cannot 
run the service. Each SeD is connected to DIET's hierarchy through 
Local Agents (LA), LAs are intended to be at the resources provider 
site. When some request reaches the SeD, it builds a reply reporting 
its state. Replies are sent back through the hierarchy up to the MA. 
Replies are ordered by some objective function that depends on 
the SeDs' state, so the "best" SeDs are first in the list. Finally the 
MA will send the list of replies to the user, who will pick some SeD 
in the list (usually the first one) and command it the task to run. 
DIET's layout makes straightforward to connect IaaS clouds as 
resource providers to the grid. IaaS systems will be connected to 
the SeD nodes, who will decide when to scale (allocate and reléase) 
resources to attend users requests. Services will be run in the VMs 
hosted in the cloud. IaaS providers can be built on top of hardware 
providers by using several open solutions such as OpenNebula [9], 
Eucalyptus [ 10] or Nimbus [ 11 ]. Such solutions have simple remote 
interfaces that SeD nodes can use to request the creation of VMs 
and/or networks to connect them. Once a VM is created, the SeD 
node will be in charge of connecting to it to run services in order 
to attend users' tasks. Fig. 2 shows a first sketch of the elements 
involved in the described layout, using OpenNebula as a possible 
IaaS Provider. In our proposal the user interacts at all times with 
DIET elements (MA and SeDs). She is totally unaware about the fact 
that SeDs may run tasks in VMs supplied by IaaS clouds. 
The hybrid approach presented here is detailed in Fig. 3. A 
new module for task allocation is placed between the IaaS system 
and DIET's SeD node (Task Allocation Module, TAM), that will 
be in charge of computing where the tasks sent by users can be 
executed and will adapt prices as demand changes. A task can 
be run in an already active VM, or in a new VM that will be 
demanded by the TAM to the cloud provider. The cloud provider 
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Fig. 2. Sketch of the proposed hybrid grid-cloud layout. 
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Fig. 3. Architecture overview. 
will have a catalog describing the hardware configuration of the 
VMs that the TAM can instantiate. Each VM will have one or more 
processing elements (virtual CPUs) with their corresponding queue 
of pending tasks. When computing allocations for a given task, the 
TAM must take into account the tasks already in the queues of each 
VM. The TAM can ask to the cloud provider whether a VM of a 
certain type can be instantiated or not which will depend on the 
resources of the physical hosts available. This is necessary so the 
TAM can determine allocations in new VMs. We assume that a set 
of disk images containing the VMs software stack (OS, libraries...) 
required to run the tasks is available. 
Now, the main goal of the grid system is to ensure that resources 
are shared in a fairly manner. To achieve this we propose a market-
based approach, that is described in detail in the next section. 
The characteristics of this approach impose certain changes in the 
way SeD nodes run. Those changes are also explained in the next 
section. 
3. Using markets to reach fairness 
Markets can be defined as a way to exchange "goods", in this 
case the right to run tasks on some infrastructure. In such market, 
resources have a certain price associated, and so users must take 
into account their (limited) budget to decide when and where 
to demand the execution of those tasks. If resource prices are 
set taking into account the demand, and budgets are allocated 
equally among users, by intrinsic market dynamics we can expect 
resources to be fairly shared (a more thorough discussion about the 
role of markets as a solution for fair resource sharing can be found 
in[12]). 
When designing a market environment several decisions must 
be taken regarding different features: 
• How curreney is managed. 
• How negotiation is performed, i.e. how requests are sent and 
how offers are collected. 
• How offers for each user request are built. 
• How resource prices, that determine each offer cost, are 
computed. 
• How the user chooses the best offer. 
The rest of this section describes the characteristics of our pro-
posed market and explains the design decisions taken regarding 
them. 
3.1. Curreney 
Users budget will be bounded by the amount of virtual curreney 
they have (using real money is possible, but is has several 
drawbacks, see Section 5.1.2). An initial budget is assigned to 
each new user in the system. Users cannot run tasks beyond 
their budget. On the other hand, curreney should be assigned to 
users to avoid the potential problems of starvation (users cannot 
access resources), depletion (users hoard curreney to monopolize 
resource access at certain times) and inflation (prices grow due 
to uncontrolled addition of curreney to the system) [13]. Several 
options are possible: 
• The global valué of all resources is periodically computed, 
taking into account their present prices. This would represent 
the total "wealth" of the system. This amount is then split and 
sent to the users. 
• A given fixed amount is sent periodically to all users. Providers 
(i.e. clouds) do not hoard the money they get from users. 
• SeD/Clouds do not hoard neither drop the money received from 
the users. Instead, all that money is periodically gathered and 
forwarded back to the users. 
The two first options can easily lead to inflation as curreney 
is injected to the system even if the demand of resources is low. 
Also, new users will be in an adverse situation as previous users 
can hold big amounts of virtual curreney. Thus, the third option 
seems the more feasible, and is in fact similar to the idea proposed 
in Mirage [14] (see Section 5). Our proposal adds a new entity, the 
Virtual Bank, which will be in charge of gathering all the incomes 
of the cloud providers. Periodically, the curreney collected by the 
Virtual Bank is evenly split and sent to the users. Payments from 
users to providers are done directly once the corresponding task 
execution is finished, with no intervention from the Virtual Bank. 
3.2. Task execution negotiation 
Every time the user needs to run a task, it sends a REQUEST_FOR 
_0FFERS message that through DIET hierarchy will reach all avail-
able SeD nodes (in fact, their corresponding TAM modules, see 
Fig. 3) connected to some cloud provider. Our simulations take into 
account three resources (more can be easily added): CPU, disk and 
memory. Henee, each request contains information about the re-
quired amount of resources (CPU measured in Mis, memory mea-
sured in MBs, and disk measured in GBs). 
When a REQUEST_FOR_OFFERS message reaches a certain 
TAM, this module will build a set of offers to execute the task. The 
process of creating offers for a request is detailed in Section 3.3. An 
allocation offer A is a tupie that contains the cost and time that 
it will take to run a given task (A™E, AC0ST). A TAM can créate 
none, one or many allocation offers for a task 7¡. When all possible 
allocations to run the task have been computed by the provider 
they are sent back to the user in an OFFERS message. If the provider 
could not find any suitable offer then the message will be empty. 
OFFER messages are sent again through DIET. Each node in the 
hierarchy (LAs, Agents and the MA) will gather all the offers they 
receive from their children nodes for each REQUEST_FOR_OFFERS 
they had forwarded before, and will build a new OFFERS message 
with the offers carried by the OFFERS messages from its children. 
Of course, the node will not build and send the new OFFERS 
message for a task until it node has received an OFFERS message 
for that task from all its children. 
Finally, only one OFFERS message will reach the user, con-
taining all offers from all SeDs. Then, the user will choose the most 
suitable allocation offer using some utility function, and will send 
a RUN_TASK message directly to the corresponding provider. If the 
OFFERS message is empty, or it does not contain any suitable offer, 
then the task is stored in a queue by the user to be tried again later. 
An offer is not suitable for a task if its cost AC0SJ is greater than the 
available user's budget, or if the time to execute it ,4TIME exceeds 
the task deadline. Each user periodically checks the tasks stored, 
discarding as failed those tasks whose deadline has expired. 
A RUN_TASK message carnes the t ime and cost conditions 
from the chosen offer. When the TAM receives such message, it 
computes again possible allocations for the task to check if it still 
can honor the offer. If it is not so (due to shortage of resources or 
changes on resource pricing) then the user is notified. In such case 
the task is stored by the user as if it had no offer. If the task can still 
be run under the offer conditions then it is executed. When the task 
is finished the result is sent to the user by a RUN_RESULT message, 
which carnes the task results or the corresponding errors. If the 
task could not be run due to some reason (e.g. unexpectedly the 
deadline was surpassed during execution) then the user discards 
the task as failed. 
3.3. Building taslis allocations offers 
Before describing how offers are built by cloud providers, it is 
necessary to outline how physical hosts and VMs are characterized. 
Then we describe the process of computing all possible options 
to run a task. Each option will then become an allocation offer 
(A™E, AC0ST) that will be sent in the corresponding OFFERS 
message. 
3.3.1. Physical hosts and virtual machines 
Each cloud provider has a catalog of VM types available 
{ V i , . . . , Vn}. Each VM type V, defines a hardware configuration 
with the resources it has: amount of Processing Elements PEs4 Vc 
and their processing speed VJ (in MIPS); memory VJ"; and disk Vd. 
Also, there is information about how long it takes to start a VM of 
that type v.START and the price of creating such instance V'.C0ST. Each 
cloud provider has a set of m physical hosts { H i , . . . , Hm}. Each host 
To avoid confusión with physical CPUs, we will denote as PEs the VMs' CPUs. 
H¡( has a set of H¡¿ CPUs all with the same processing capacity Hsk. 
For each processor p¡(j (1 < / < Hk) in host H¡( we represent by 
pj¡, the available processing capacity of that CPU (in MIPS), i.e. the 
processing capacity not used for any of the VMs allocated in the 
host. Conversely p \ ¡ is the used capacity, so pj¡, + p \ ¡ = Hsk. Also, 
the amount of memory in host k is given by H™, while H™'a and 
H™'u are the available and used memory in that host respectively. 
H® represents the amount of disks of host k, and Hk represents 
their capacity. For each diskz^) (1 < / < H®),!^ andz,", are the 
available and used storage capacity of diskz^) (zkl + z"(l = z¡(j). 
When a new VM of type V, is allocated in some host H¡( then the 
corresponding valúes are updated. The PEs must be allocated in Vc 
physical CPUs (of course Vc < H^) with enough available capacity. 
For example, processor p/<i would be assigned one of VM's PEs 
only if p^
 1 > VJ. When one PE is assigned to some physical CPU 
its corresponding parameters are updated so for example pak x = 
Pk i ~~ V.s. Also, the host available memory must be enough to 
alíocate the VM memory, and if so then it must be updated when 
the VM is finally created H™'fl = H™'fl - VJ". Finally, the capacity 
of the disk where the VM storage will be set is also updated so 
zki = zki~V?-H™'U andz,", are updated likewise. If there are more 
than one host where the VM can be created, then the host running 
more VMs is used for the new VM. The goal is to use as less physical 
hosts as possible at all t imes, which in turn should impact on the 
power consumption (unused hosts can be in sleep mode, which 
will demand less power). On the other hand, as t ime passes some 
VMs can become idle, i.e. they have run all tasks assigned and are 
waiting for new tasks to be executed. Periodically it is checked how 
long each one of these idle VMs has been in that state. If any VM 
has been idle for a period longer than a certain threshold time, that 
VM is switch off and its resources are released. So if the VM was of 
type Vj and was running on host H¡(, then the available resources 
are updated as expected: H™'a = H™'a + VJ", and so on. 
All PEs have a FIFO queue of tasks associated. When a RUN_ 
TASK message reaches a cloud provider the set of possible allo-
cations must be computed again to check whether that task can 
be run within the cost and time originally offered (which are car-
ried by the RUN_TASK message). If so, the provider will choose 
among the found allocations the one that maximizes the user's util-
ity function. Depending on the allocation, the task can (1) be as-
signed to a free PE and start immediately; (2) be assigned to a PE 
that is busy (an then it will be added to the PE's task queue); (3) 
require to start a new VM, in such case a new VM instance will be 
created, once it is ready the task will be assigned to any of its PEs. 
The algorithm to compute all possible allocations for a task is de-
scribed in the next section. 
3.3.2. Task allocations computation 
An allocation for a task is the assignation of the t a sk to a certain 
PE in some VM. Each allocation will have a cost and duration 
C4T1ME AC0ST~) 
When an user asks for offers to compute a task, or sends a 
request to execute it, potential allocations for that task must be 
looked for. In the former case, each allocation found is sent back to 
the user as an offer (see Section 3.2). In the latter case, if some of 
the possible task allocations meets the time and budget given by 
the user, then the task will be processed by the corresponding PE. 
All the possible allocations for a task are calculated by an 
algorithm that comprises two steps: (1) first the TAM analyzes 
the VMs already present and whether they can run the task; 
(2) then the possibility of creating new VMs to run the tasks is 
checked. The output of each step will be a collection of allocations. 
Both sets will be combined resulting in the final set of potential 
allocations for the task. The remaining of this section details these 
two steps, specifying also how AC0SJ and ÁÍME are computed for 
each allocation: 
1. First, the TAM analyzes the state of the already present VMs in 
order to find running VMs where the task could be executed. 
They are grouped by the VM type (Vj) they belong to. These VMs 
can be active (running some other tasks) or idle (all PEs are free). 
Idle VMs are checked first. 
For a task i, let c¡, d¡ and m¡ be the amount of CPU, memory and 
disk required by that task respectively. The time to run the task 
i in an idle machine of type Vj is AT1ME = c¡/Vs. Regarding cost 
computation, let Pm, P¿ and Pc be the price of 1 MB of memory, 
1 GB of disk, or the computation of MI (prices computation is 
explained in Section 3.4), then the cost of the task is computed 
as: 
AC0S1 = Pmmi + Pddi + PcC¡. (1) 
After looking for allocations in the idle VMs, active VMs are 
checked too, i.e. those VMs whose PEs are running some other 
tasks. For each active VM of type Vj, the TAM checks each 
one of its Vc PEs to see when it will be available (it will 
not be running any task and its queues are empty). Let q 
be the amount of tasks waiting in the PE's queue, numbered 
from 1 to q. Let [c\,..., cq], {nx\,..., mq] and {d i , . . . , dq] the 
CPU, memory and disk those tasks demand. Let also c0 the 
remaining Mis to be executed of the task being run when the 
allocations are computed. Then, the PE will be busy until t¡, = 
(co + 12o<x<a cx) A7- If a t ff> t n e amount of disk and memory 
that will be available in the VM (i.e., not used by the tasks run 
by the others PEs in at t¡,, which is known studying their queues) 
will be enough to run the task, then a new allocation where the 
task is assigned to that PE can be built. The time to run the task 
will be: 
Co + E Cx + Cí 
0<x<q 
v7 ' (2) 
The cost of running the task is computed as before (see Eq. (1)). 
2. Second, each VM type Vj is analyzed to check (a) if a new VM 
instance of that type could run the task, i.e: Vm > m¡; Vd > 
d¡; (b) if there is any physical host H¡( with enough spare 
capacity where the VM can be instantiated, that is, it has enough 
available memory Vm < H™'a, it has some disk with enough 
available storage Vd < z£, and it has Vc processors with enough 
spare processing capacity Vs. 
If both conditions are met, then a new allocation has been found. 
The allocation time is computed as the addition of the time to 
start the VM, plus the time to run the task itself: 
ySTART . (3) 
The allocation cost is computed as the addition of the cost of 
instantiating the VM, plus the cost of using the resources for the 
duration of the task which depends on their price. Let Pm, P¿ and 
Pc be the prices of memory, disk and CPU (price computation is 
explained in Section 3.4). Then: 
V,L + Pmmi+Pddi +Pcc¡. (4) 
3.3.3. Choosing the best allocation to run a task 
When the SeD receives a task to run (in a RUN_TASK message) 
and the TAM has computed all the suitable allocations for that task, 
then one of those allocations must be chosen. The TAM applies the 
user' utility function to choose which is the best allocation choice. 
But in some cases different allocations will have the same time 
and cost (and so the same utility valué). For example, one allocation 
can run the task in an already active VM with some free PEs, and 
another one can run the task in an idle VM of the same type. So, 
when several allocations have the same time and cost the TAM 
applies some heuristics that favor energy saving to choose the 
definitive allocation for the task: 
• The grid will prioritize those allocations that will run the task 
in an already active VM (i.e. one or more of its PEs are running 
tasks). 
• If no allocation in an active VM is found, then the grid will 
prioritize those allocations that assign the task to an already 
present VM (which will be idle). If there are several idle 
machines, the VMs that have been idle for the shortest period 
of time are preferred. The goal is to keep idle machines in that 
state while possible, so their resources will be eventually freed 
when they are shut down (the grid shuts down the VMs that 
have been idle for longer than a certain time). 
• Only if no allocations in active or idle VMs are found, then 
allocations that require instantiating a new VM are considered. 
3.4. Resource prices computation 
The price adaptation mechanism applied takes into account the 
resources demand to change prices accordingly. This algorithm is 
run periodically by the TAM to compute the price of the resources 
in the cloud. 
A cloud provider will price resources differently depending on 
the goals pursued. To maximize benefits, the provider could apply 
the approach explained in [15]. But in coUaborative environments, 
the cloud provider can also try to maximize resource usage and so 
the amount of tasks run. The latter is the approach taken in this 
work. 
The algorithm goes as follows. Let r be the total amount of some 
resource in the provider's site, measured in a certain unit (e.g. MBs 
of memory). Let rd(t), ra(t) and rw(t) the amount of demanded 
resources by all tasks in the grid (running or in queues), available 
resources, and resources demanded only by waiting tasks at time 
t.The amount offree resources ra{t) isgivenbythe addition ofthe 
free resources in all physical hosts plus the available resources in 
all the virtual machines they run (i.e. unused by the tasks being 
processed at that moment). At all times rd(t) = r —ra(t) + rw(t). 
Also, often (but not always) if rw(t) > 0 then ra(t) = 0. Let Pr(t) 
by the price at time t. Price is adapted periodically every s seconds 
as described in Eq. (5) (let t' = t + s): 
r
d(t') 
PÁt') 
Pr(t)x Í 1 + 
if rd(r') > 0Ar d ( r ) > 0 
/ rd(t') (5) 
if rd(t') > 0Ar d ( r ) = 0 
lP r(r) /2 ifrd(r') = 0. 
The first case in Eq. (5) aims to increase (decrease) the price 
depending on the amount of resources demanded over (below) the 
total available. The exponent modulates the adaptation depending 
on how sharp the change on resources demand has been since 
the last price recomputation. The second case is identical to the 
first one, to be applied when rd(t) = 0. Finally, if the amount of 
resources used at t is 0, then the price is divided by 2. 
3.5. Processing of offers by users 
To simúlate real users behavior is far from trivial. Usually, logs 
of task requests in real-world grids are helpful to reproduce a real 
load. However, they do not capture users reactions to situations 
where their requests could not be run due for example to resource 
contention, i.e. how they prioritize their tasks, how they choose 
between different execution options from different grids when 
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Fig. 4. Main architecture elements and interactions. 
available (usually grid usage logs refer to a single grid), how many 
tasks were outdated while waiting in the users queues, etc. Thus, 
instead of going through static load records, we chose to simúlate 
users as dynamic entities that take planning decisions about their 
tasks. 
3.5.2. Utility function for offer selection 
For each REQUEST_FOR_OFFERS issued by the user, the MA 
will send back a list of possible allocations (offers). The user will 
first filter those offers that cannot be accepted because of time or 
cost restrictions. Each task has a deadline associated, so offers that 
would last beyond that deadline will not be considered by the user. 
Also, if the offer cost is greater than the user actual budget the offer 
is likewise rejected. 
Then, the user must choose the best offer among the remaining 
ones. This depends on the user own priorities. Users will define a 
utility function u : R>0xR>0 -> Rtoexpress the "utility" orworth 
of each task depending on the cost and time to execute it. The 
utility function is applied to the offers received, and the offer with 
the greatest utility valué will be chosen. A possible utility function 
isu(AC0ST,ATIME) = (AC0STxA™E)-\\fthe user isonly concerned 
about the time to execute the task regardless of its cost then the 
utility could be defined as u(AC0S\ A1ME) = (A™E)-\ The goal is 
to enable users to express their preferences, e.g. not to spend too 
much in a task (although it takes longer to run it) or to run the task 
as quickly as possible (even if it is expensive). 
3.5.2. Negotiation strategies 
When some user requests execution offers for a task, she can 
face different situations: 
• No offer is received, or all fail to meet the time and cost bounds 
imposed, that is the task deadline and the user budget. Then, 
the user can just label the task as "failed" or store it in a queue 
for later retrial. 
• Some offers are suitable. Then, the best is chosen using the 
utility function as described in 3.5.1. The task is sent to the 
corresponding provider. In such case, still two things can 
happen. 
- The offer can still be honored by the provider, and so the task 
is executed. 
- The provider cannot fulfill the offer any more (e.g. due to a 
load burst after the offer was computed). Again, the user can 
then ignore the task or retry it. 
If failed tasks are stored, then users will prioritize them to 
set which tasks must be tried again first. Each task i will have a 
valué /¡ to represent its importance/priority. A basic strategy is 
to order tasks by importance so those with higher /¡ valúes are 
retrieved from the queue and tried again first. We denote this 
strategy Priority by Importance. Yet, in real situations users will take 
also into account the "risk" of not being able to execute some task 
before its deadline expires. For example, if one task has a higher 
importance than another one, but there is still plenty of time to 
run the first while the second task's deadline is cióse, then the user 
can prefer to run the second task first. We propose the following 
mechanism for our simulations to set the tasks priorities: for each 
task i we compute the risk of not being able to run it on time as the 
coefficient between the task size (c¡) and the remaining time until 
the task deadline T¡ (how the deadline is computed is explained in 
Section 4), which at time t is T¡ — t. Then, this risk is multiplied by 
the task importance J¡ to get the priority of the task. So, the priority 
oftaskiattime t is computed as c¡ x (T¡ —1)_1 x / ¡ . The user queue 
that stores the tasks will order them by this valué. We denote this 
other strategy Priority by Risk. 
Users will periodically check if they have pending tasks stored, 
choose the one with the highest priority, and start the negotiation 
to run the task (see Section 3.2). This is done also every time that 
the user receives the result of another task. 
Also, when the user has chosen the best offer for a certain task, 
she can store the other suitable offers instead of just discarding 
them. Thus, if the offer initially chosen is not valid anymore, then 
the user can try the other alternative offers before requesting 
new ones. In that case, providers can also send alternative offers 
when they are not able to run the task with the conditions of the 
original offer. These new alternative offers will be blended with 
the ones the user already stores for the task. As long as there 
are suitable alternative offers, the user will not send any new 
REQUEST_FOR_OFFERS message. 
Fig. 4 summarizes the main architectural elements presented in 
this section and their interactions as part of the market-oriented 
grid architecture proposed. 
4. Simulations results 
This section studies the best strategies for the user, and also two 
features of the system: adaptability to load changes and fairness. 
Table 1 
Catalog of VM types available. 
VM type 
Normal 
Large 
Extra-large 
PEs (Vf x V¡) 
1 PE at 1 GHz 
4 PEs at 1 GHz 
8 PEs at 1.5 GHz 
Mem {Vp (GBs) 
1.5 
7.5 
15 
Disk (V,") (GBs) 
160 
850 
1690 
4.1. Cloud provider setup 
As explained in Section 2, each cloud provider has a catalog 
of types of VMs that it can instantiate to attend users requests. 
For the experiments presented here, providers are assigned a 
catalog defining three types of VMs that can be instantiated (these 
types closely correspond to the ones defined in EC2 catalog5). This 
catalog is described in Table 1. These types correspond to the 
set {Vu ..., Vn] introduced in Section 3.3.1. The Vf™1 and V/™1 
parameters for each type are set to minimal valúes so they do 
not interfere in the results outcome. Thus, the cost is set to 0, 
although in real settings administrators could choose to discourage 
the usage of certain VM types by assigning them higher prices. 
Also, the creation time is set to 1, which the authors know is fairly 
optimistic but will not introduce biases in the results: the goal 
is not to study which is the best/most chosen VM type, but the 
performance of the system as a whole. 
Tasks processing requirements will be expressed in Mis, so we 
need to convert GHzs to MIPS. Such conversión is never accurate 
in any architecture, and it strongly depends on the software being 
run. But an approximate conversión can be 1 GHz = 6000 MIPS.6 
Also, it is needed to define the amount of hardware resources 
of each cloud provider. Table 2 shows the amount of physical 
hosts and the resources of each one: memory, CPUs (with their 
processing speed) and disks (with their size). The hardware 
configuration of a standard cluster host is cióse to typical blade 
hardware settings,7 the configuration of hosts in the other cluster 
types are defined taken that one as reference. 
Each provider updates the prices of resources every 50 s. All 
providers set initial prices as follows: Pc = 100 (per MI), Pm = 
1000 (per MB), Pc = 1000 (per GB). Also, as commented in 
Section 3.3.1, each provider will check for idle VMs every 50 s. 
When a VM is found that has been idle for more than 600 s, the 
VM is turn off. 
4.2. Nodes setup 
Nodes in the system (DIET nodes, TAMs, the Virtual Bank) 
have all the same bandwidth, 1 Mb (which is quite conservative). 
All messages are 1 Kb. The Virtual Bank retrieves money from 
providers and splits it among users every 1000 s. We assume 
messages processing time is negligible. This can be safely assumed 
even for messages that imply the computation of allocations for a 
task, as the process has little complexity and this complexity grows 
linearly with the amount of present VMs and the cluster size. 
4.3. Users behavior 
We deem interesting to study which strategy is better suited 
for the user benefit before further research. That way, we can 
make a reasonable assumption about how users will behave in real 
situations, which we will apply in our later experiments. 
The setting applied to study users strategies is as follows. 
We assume a scenario with two prívate clouds, each one getting 
http://aws.amazon.com/ec2/instance-types/. 
See for example the valúes shown in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
lnstructions_per_second. 
' See for example http://www.sgi.com/products/servers/half_depth/2u_intel_ 
2p.html. 
resources from a Small cluster (see Table 2). Also, we assume 20 
users, each one with 500 tasks to run. Time between the issuing of 
new tasks follows an exponential distribution. Initially, the average 
time between tasks is set to A-1 = 30 s. 
For each task i, its size c¡ also follows an exponential distribution 
with average size 106 MI. Also, for each task it is necessary to know 
the máximum amount of time the user will accept to wait to get 
the task result. This time will be proportional to the task size and a 
new magnitude that we denote urgency factor / ¡ . This magnitude 
simulates the fact that not all results are equally critical for the 
user, so more important ones will get a higher/¡ valué. Then, if task 
i is created at t then the task deadline will be T¡ = t + c¡ x /¡ , 
that is, the time the user is ready to wait to obtain the result 
is proportional to both the size and importance of the task. In 
our experiments/¡ is uniformly chosen from the following valúes: 
{0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 10, 100}. The memory m¡ and disk d¡ required 
are also uniformly chosen from different sets of valúes. In our 
experiments these were {10, 20, 30, 40, 50} MBs for memory size 
and {10, 20, 30, 50, 60, 100} GBs for disk size. 
Finally, each task i importance (/¡), which is required to know its 
priority against other tasks (see Section 3.5.2), must be computed 
too. As in [16], we split tasks into two categories: high importance 
taslis and low importance taslis. Also as in [16], 20% of tasks will be 
of high importance. The importance of tasks of high importance 
follows a normal distribution with mean 100 and standard 
deviation 50. The importance of tasks of low importance follows a 
normal distribution with mean 10 and standard deviation 5. Note 
that we do not relate importance with the máximum amount of 
currency the user will accept to pay for a task. As long as one offer's 
cost is not greater than the present user budget (minus the cost of 
the tasks already under execution, to ensure that the user never 
runs out of enough currency to pay an executed task), the offer can 
be accepted by the user. 
The utility function u applied by users to choose the best offer 
is: 
u(AC0S\ A™E) = (AC0ST x A ™ V . (6) 
The initial price of processing one MI is 100. The initial price of 
one MB and of one GB of disk is the same, 10 000. Each user has an 
initial budget of 109 currency units. 
As explained in Section 3.5.2 users can follow two different 
strategies: 
• Retry asking for offers for those tasks that do get an acceptable 
offer. Those tasks are stored in a queue ordered by priority. 
Each user will pick the first task in the queue and send a 
REQUEST_F0R_0FFERS message for that task every time the 
result of another task is received, and periodically at a certain 
rate. Experimentally we have seen that a low rate is enough 
to ensure that stored tasks do not have to wait long periods of 
time. We set this rate to 500 s. 
• Keep alternative offers sent in the OFFERS message, i.e. those 
offers that were not chosen initially by the user. If the grid 
replies in the RUN_RESULT message that it failed to run the 
task, the user will check first whether there are still alternative 
offers for that task. If so, one of them will be chosen (using 
the user' utility function). Only when the user runs out of 
alternative offers a new REQUEST_F0R_0FFERS message will 
be sent. 
Four sets of five experiments were run, each set corresponding 
to a different users' strategy. Results are shown in Fig. 5 in four 
set of histograms, one histogram per experiment. Each histogram 
depicts the amount of tasks that were successful, that did not find 
a suitable offer due to budget limitations, etc. If we look at the 
first set of histograms, we see that the proportion of failed tasks 
is really high (due also in part to the high load). Almost all failed 
tasks are due to budget constraints: the user cannot afford paying 
Table 2 
Hw configurations forcloud providers in experiments. 
Cluster Hosts CPUs/host (Htc x H¡ Mem/host (Htra) (GBs) Disks/host (H° x Hdk 
Small 
Standard 
Powerful 
4 
5 
10 
2 CPUs at 2 GHzs 
8 CPUs at 2 GHzs 
12 CPUs at 3 GHzs 
16 
64 
96 
2 x 1 TBs 
8 x 2 TBs 
12 x 2 TBs 
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Fig. 5. Impact of retrials on request for offers and usage of alternative offers. 
for the task given the offers received ("No Offer Fits Budget"). A 
small set of tasks fail because no offer can run the task before the 
deadline is met ("No Offer Fits Deadline"). And another set of tasks 
fail because when the cloud provider is asked to run a task under 
certain cost and time conditions (extracted from the offer chosen 
by the user) those conditions cannot be fulfilled any more ("No 
Allocation Possible For Offer"). 
The second set of histograms show the results when the user 
applies the alternative offers. This policy does not bring any 
significant improvement in terms of the successful tasks rate. 
Much more useful is asking for new offers (i.e. as long as the 
task deadline can be met) as shown in the third and fourth group 
of histograms. Now each task is stored until either a provider runs 
it or the task expires. Using alternative offers slightly improves the 
rate of successful tasks. i.e., it is better to use alternative offers 
before performing requests for new ones. Another interesting 
metric to study is the sum of the valúes (importance) assigned 
to the executed and failed tasks, y\„.,.=== I¡ and y^p=íl=j /¡, which 
' z—'buccess ' z—<railed " 
should be maximized and minimized respectively. In both cases, 
the combination of using alternative offers and asking for new ones 
get the best results. 
Our results show how simple user strategies such as storing 
tasks with no offers to retry them later have a significant positive 
effect on the final system outcome. Thus, it should be assumed 
that users will implement such strategies in real world situations. 
In the rest of the simulations presented users will use alternative 
offers if there are any. When no alternatives offer are available, 
then the user will store the task in her queue and resend 
REQUEST_F0R_0FFERS messages when the task is chosen again 
to be executed among the enqueued ones. This contrasts with 
typical approaches where failed tasks are simply discarded. 
4.3.1. Tasks priority 
Also, we have studied the positive impact of the prioritization 
mechanism for stored tasks we propose (see Section 3.5.2), Priority 
by Risk, compared with the most straightforward Priority by 
Importance approach. In these experiments users will retry failed 
tasks and will use alternative offers. The setting of all parameters 
is similar to the one used in the previous experiments, but each 
user will run 5000 tasks, and load is changed by setting an average 
time between tasks of 50. 
Fig. 6 shows the results. Recall that the priority is represented 
by the valué assigned to the task, and that tasks can be of two kinds, 
those with high valué and those with low valué (see Section 4.3). 
Fig. 6(a) and (b) show the amount of failed and total tasks for both 
types, when users apply priority by importance. Fig. 6(c) and (d) 
show the results when users order tasks by risk. 
It can be observed from Fig. 6 that, for both sets of valúes, 
when applying priority by risk the proportion of successful tasks 
is greater (around 77% in total) that when applying priority by 
importance (when is only around 66%). Regarding the total valué 
of the successful tasks (^success'O' Pri°rity by risk yields an 
improvement of 11% compared with priority by importance. On the 
other hand X^Faiied '> ' s 62% lower when using priority by risk than 
when using priority by importance. Due to its better performance, 
it can be assumed that users will prefer using the priority by risk 
strategy to order their taslis. This will be assumed during the next 
experiments. Also, this was the policy applied in the experiments 
shown in previous Section 4.3 (we tested that using priority by 
importance does not alter the conclusión that retrying tasks and 
using alternative offers is the best choice). 
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Fig. 6. Failed and total tasks for different task priority mechanisms. 
4.3.2. About users behavior: summing up 
The main goal of this section was to find out the strategies that 
bring the best outcome for users: 
• When no suitable offer is found for some task, it is worth to 
store it for later retrieval instead of just discarding it, even it 
this strategy means that tasks will have to "compete" as user' 
budget is limited. 
• It is better to use alternative offers before requesting new offers 
to the grid. 
• The Priority by Risk strategy to order enqueued tasks results in 
less failed tasks. 
Once these best strategies have been identified we can build 
a representative characterization of users. This is necessary to 
simúlate market-based scenarios realistically, where users take 
decisions regarding tasks ordering, etc., instead of just discarding 
failed tasks. 
4.4. System adaptability 
Once the most beneficial/likely strategies for users have been 
settled, it is time to study the behavior of the market-based 
system proposed. Two properties must be analyzed: adaptability 
and fairness. This section addresses the ability of a cloud provider 
to adapt to a changing load, while fairness is studied in the next 
section. 
Recall that load can be controlled by setting the average time 
between tasks for each user, A.-1, to different valúes. To check 
system adaptation an experiment will be run where A-1 will be 
changed to check the performance under different loads.Thus, A-1 
is set initially (r = 0) to 75, to 7.5 at t = 10 000, to 75 again at 
t = 15 000andfinallyto750atr = 20 000.There will be 10 users, 
each one with 2000 tasks to run, and one single cloud provider on 
top of a Powerful cluster (see Table 2). The rest of the setup is similar 
to the previous experiments. 
Results are shown in Fig. 7. It depicts the amount of allocated 
and running PEs, along with the number of tasks waiting in VMs 
queues (the number of tasks in execution is of course equal 
to the number of running PEs). It can be observed that the 
system successfully reacts to the increased demand of resources 
by allocating new Processing Elements in new VMs at t = 10 000, 
where tasks will be run. Likewise, when the rate is decreased again 
at t = 15 000 to the initial valué the amount of running PEs falls 
abruptly, and so does the amount of PEs allocated later. Finally, 
when the rate shrinks at t = 20 000 once again the system adapts 
and uses a mínimum amount of resources. The reason because 
the changes on the amount of allocated PEs is abrupt is that users 
choose offers that will cause their tasks to be run in VMs oíExtra-
large type, which are faster (see the VM definitions in Table 1), but 
require more CPU resources. 
4.5. Fairness 
Achieving fairness is the main goal of grid market-based 
systems. Fairness refers to how resource usage is split among 
users by providers. No user should be able to require resources 
without limits, as this could lead to resource shortage for others. 
But users should be able to run their tasks as long as they do 
not impact on other users throughput even if they have a higher 
resource demand. On the other hand, there should also be a limit 
on resources usage so when under high demand from several users, 
those users demanding too many resources will not be able to get 
all ofthem. 
To test the fairness of our system three experiments were run, 
each one assigning to the (only) provider cloud available one Small 
cluster, one Standard cluster and one Powerful cluster respectively. 
All experiments have 30 users, split into three sets of 10 users each. 
The average time between tasks for each set are 500,200, and 25 s 
respectively. Each user will try to run 2000 tasks. 
Fig. 8 shows the amount of tasks successfully run or failed (they 
expired before they could be executed) during the initial part of 
the experiment for three users, each one with a different task 
generation rate (users with the same rate show all very similar 
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Fig. 8. Fairness: tasks run and failed, initial part of the experiment. 
behavior), in the three different settings. In a powerful cluster 
(Fig. 8(a)) all users can run their tasks with no restriction, as 
there are enough resources to attend all petitions regardless of the 
resources they demand. But in a standard cluster (Fig. 8(b)) the 
cloud cannot serve all petitions, i.e. there is a certain resources 
shortage, and so some tasks fail. Yet, this does not affect all users 
evenly: users with low demand are not affected by this resource 
shortage and can run their tasks as in the previous setting. Also, 
users with médium demand are able to run almost all their tasks as 
before, and are only very lightly impacted by the lack of resources. 
Users with a high load, however, cannot run all their tasks anymore 
as they demand more resources than the amount the cloud will 
grant to any user. As a result, many tasks from users with high 
load will fail. Note that around t = 50 000 users with high load 
will have already initiated all their tasks, so from that moment on 
they will only request to run the tasks enqueued. Finally, when 
using a small cluster (Fig. 8(c)), the same effect seen in the standard 
cluster is found again but amplified. Users with small and médium 
load are only lightly affected, as their demand for resources can 
be attended by the cloud. In contrast, many tasks from users with 
a high generation rate fail (more in fact that the amount of run 
tasks). Note also how the rate of successful tasks from the users 
with médium rate is increased little after t = 50 000. The reason is 
that users with high rate are only trying to run tasks stored in their 
queues, thus effectively lowering their need for resources. 
In Fig. 9 we show the run and failed tasks for the small 
cluster until the end of the experiment. While users with low and 
médium demand keep the same task execution rate, users with 
high demand only very slowly are able to keep running tasks. After 
users with médium load have left the system (they have finished 
all their tasks) the demand of resources is so low that users can 
again run requests at high rate (recall that users check their tasks 
stored in their queues every 500 s and also every time that one task 
result is received, which allows for fast re-sending of tasks when 
resources are available). 
These results lead to interesting conclusions. Users can try to 
run more tasks up to a certain rate as long as they do not interfere 
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with other users. This is positive, as we do not forcé all users to 
work at the lowest rate. But if the resource demand by some user 
is too high then the system penalizes the user by not running many 
of her tasks, the user will have to store them until many eventually 
expire (fail), the system does not subtract resources from other 
users needs. 
5. Relatedwork 
Despite being a recent technology, cloud computing has already 
raised the interest of the research community. Present research on 
IaaS systems is focusing on two main topics: 
• Enabling the allocation of distributed resources on federated 
cloud systems. Open Cirrus [17], the Sky Computing [11] 
initiative or the EU Reservoir [18] joint research project are 
works oriented to the construction of such environments. 
• Automatic scaling to adjust resources allocation to the demand. 
Automatic scaling is already implemented in some commercial 
solutions such as Amazon, where users configure scaling actions 
based on hardware state metrics such as CPU usage, etc. Other 
works [19,20] propose more flexible scaling mechanisms based 
on service state in federated environments. 
Regarding clouds and grids, there was some initial confusión 
about the differences and similarities between the two, although 
this was soon addressed by the community [1]. Later work [21] 
has further clarified the distinction between them, and analyzed 
how grids could evolve to benefit from the ideas introduced by the 
cloud (or the other way around, see for example [22]). In [23,24] 
the authors present an architecture for the dynamic provisión of 
resources to the virtual organizations (VO) of a grid. Part of the 
same team lead the StratusLab8 project, a strong initiative in this 
regard. StratusLab is an EU joint research project that views clouds 
and grids as complementary technologies. StratusLab proposes 
three methods to intégrate them: 
• Deploy a grid site (based on EGEE9 software) within a public 
cloud (Amazon's). 
• Apply clouds for resource provisioning in grids. 
• Add IaaS-like interfaces to existing grid services. 
The second method lies cióse to the approach introduced in 
this work. But StratusLab goal is to virtualize an entire grid site 
for dynamic provisión of worker nodes, while this proposal rather 
connects a grid system (DIET) to one or more clouds to get a supply 
of VMs in the same dynamic mode. StratusLab, on the other hand, 
does not apply economic models to ensure fair resource sharing. 
5.1. Economy-based grid systems 
Applying an economic approach in a grid system is hardly a new 
idea. Buyya et al. [4] already introduced a market based framework 
for grids, with an analysis of different market approaches such as 
http ://stratuslab.eu. 
http ://www.eu-egee.org. 
auctions, posted price, tendering/contract-net, etc. In [25] the 
authors further discuss how economy can be applied to efficiently 
manage resources on grid environments and the advantages 
of such solutions (automatic regulation of supply and demand, 
scalability...). 
It is not our intention to make a complete survey of all economy-
based grid proposals (see [13,5] for such overview of market-
oriented grid systems). But in the remaining of this section we will 
comment how some of those works relate to two main aspects 
of the system proposed here, i.e. price computation and currency 
distribution. 
5.1.1. Price computation 
Regarding proposals for resource price computation, Libra [26] 
and Libra+$ [16] suggest mechanisms for setting resource prices 
depending on demand. However they depend on some parameters 
whose valúes are arbitrary (must be tuned depending on the 
system and tasks). In contrast, our pricing solution does not 
requires such parameter valúes guessing. 
G-commerce [27] proposes a formal pricing solution based 
on markets theory that aims to get the equilibrium prices of all 
resources. The equilibrium price is a market concept. In a market 
scenario, if the price of a commodity is low the demand will 
grow, in turn if the price of a commodity is high the demand 
will decrease. The equilibrium price in a market is the price 
reached when supply is equal to the demand. Unfortunately, such 
solution cannot be applied here. To compute the equilibrium price 
is required to have knowledge of the global demand of all resources 
in all SeDs, which we assume is not feasible in many scenarios. 
On the other hand auction systems such as Bellagio [28], 
Mirage [14], and Tycoon [29] do not need providers to compute 
the price of resources. Users are the ones who must compete for 
the resources they require by bidding, so the resource is assigned 
to the highest bids. But then is the users who must decide policies 
to set the initial bid, how much increase the bid each time, what 
is the máximum bid, etc. So an auction approach is not easier to 
implement, it simply assigns more responsibility to users. 
Other proposals such as FirstPrice [30], FirstReward [31] 
or FirstOpportunity [32] do not propose any resource price 
computation mechanism. 
5.2.2. Distribution of virtual currency 
Currency creation and circulation is an important concept in 
any market system. An option suggested in some works is to 
use real currency instead of virtual one [28], so users will take 
real care when demanding resources. Also, this solution frees the 
system from having to inject virtual currency and assign it to users. 
However, this approach has several inconveniences. For example, 
users with more economic means (e.g. better funding) will get 
more resources, leading to unfair situations. Also, in scientific 
environments users could be reluctant to spare real currency 
for resources as they often work in other kind of settings were 
resources, even if scarce, are freely available. Thus, using virtual 
currency, created and distributed by the system seems to be the 
most feasible solution. 
There are several options to inject and circuíate virtual 
currency: 
• Each provider (SeD) periodically reports to some central entity 
(Virtual Bank) about the valué of all the resources it can deliver, 
taking into account their updated price. This would represent 
the 'wealth' of the system. This amount is then split and send 
to the users. However this solution would cause permanent 
inflation. 
• The Virtual Bank periodically sends a certain amount to all 
users. Providers do not hoard money. But it is then necessary to 
decide how much assign to users, i.e. how much currency inject 
to the system. Arbitrary amounts could cause artificial inflation 
or deflation. 
• The SeD/Cloud does not hoard neither drops the currency it 
gathers. Instead, it sends it to the Virtual Bank which will 
forward it to the users. This approach seems the more suitable. 
In fact, the third approach is similar to the idea proposed in 
Mirage [14]. Also, to avoid hoarding by users, Mirage implements a 
taxing system that periodically reduces users budget so they do not 
tend to store currency too long. The currency obtained thorough 
this taxing system is then distributed back to user, as in the case 
of the clouds income. A similar mechanism could be used in our 
proposal. 
Other works do not shed light to this problem, at least in the 
scenario proposed here. In Bellagio [28] users receive a budget 
proportional to the resources they provide, but this cannot be 
applied here as for the sake of flexibility DIET users are not assumed 
to be providers as well (although they could be). G-commerce [27] 
follows a similar approach to the one defined in the second point of 
the list above. They do not set any mechanism to decide how much 
to assign to users at each iteration. Tycoon [29] does not make any 
assumption, users "... are funded at some regular rote. The system 
administrators set their income rate based on exogenously determined 
priorities", or "... bring resources... must earnfunds by enticing other 
users topay for their resources". FirstPrice [30] does not say anything 
about the subject. FirstReward [31] proponents explicitly state 
that they do not address how currency is injected or recycled. 
FirstProfit, FirstOpportunity [32] and Aggregate Utility [33] do 
not say anything about the subject (Aggregate Utility [33] in fact 
encourages using real currency). 
6. Conclusions 
The system presented in this paper is a proposal to combine 
grid and cloud systems through a market-based approach. Grids 
can benefit from clouds by requesting and releasing resources from 
them, thus not being forced to have their own pool of resources. 
However, the grid system needs some criteria to know when to 
take resource scaling decisions. This criteria must of course take 
into account the demand induced by the tasks sent by the users. 
By applying the pricing adaptation mechanism here proposed, 
grids can now scale resources automatically, while at the same 
time ensuring fairness in resource sharing. Future work will 
consist on implementing this on a real system: adapting DIET, 
programming the Virtual Bank and TAM, and connecting the TAM 
to some IaaS cloud provider, based for example on OpenNebula. 
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Appendix. Extensions to GridSim 
Our simulation software is based on GridSim [6], a well known 
simulation framework injava for grid environments. In this section 
we briefly introduce the design of our simulator and the extensions 
done to the main GridSim components, needed for our cloud-grid 
hybrid system. Keep in mind that the diagrams shown in this 
section are merely descriptive, and do not provide a complete 
design view of the simulation software. 
Generic GridSim simulations are based on the GridSimCore 
class. This class has the basic functionality for net Communications 
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and event handling. The DIET-related entities of our simulations, 
i.e. User, MasterAgent, Agent and LocalAgent extend this 
class as shown in Fig. A.l. The VirtualBank, which gathers the 
currency earned by the cloud providers and sends it back to the 
users (see Section 3.1) is based on this class as well. These classes 
use default GridSim functionality, without adding new features to 
its standard behavior. The GridResource class of GridSim, on the 
other hand, is intended to represent a group of machines that are 
available for the grid tasks. But it is not designed to support the 
dynamic addition or removal of machines (or VMs in this case). We 
extend it with the laaSResource class, that extends the default 
behavior so the VMs available can be changed as the simulation 
evolves. Each IaaS cloud will be represented by an instance of 
laaSResource. 
The mechanism to compute allocations and assign tasks to 
PEs, which is described in Section 3.3.2, is implemented by class 
IaaSAllocPolicy, which extends GridSim's AllocPolicy 
class. Each instance of IaaSAllocPolicy will contain an 
instance of the PriceAdaptor class for price adaptation. Thus, 
TAM's functionality is implemented by IaaSAllocPolicy. 
To simúlate the management of tasks, VMs, and physical hosts, 
it was necessary to extend several GridSim classes, as shown 
in Fig. A.2. In GridSim, the Machine class represents a host, 
containing a set of PEs (class PE). Each PE instance executes 
tasks, which are represented by the ResGridlet class. A new 
IaaSMachine class, based on Machine has been developed. Each 
instance of this class represents a VM. This class handles a queue of 
tasks per PE, which is not provided by GridSim. Physical resources 
are represented in a new package c lus te r . Accounting of physical 
resources (as explained in Section 3.3.2) is performed by this 
package. 
References 
Luis M. Vaquero, Luis Rodero-Merino, Juan Cáceres, Maik Lindner, A break 
in the clouds: towards a cloud definition, ACM SIGCOMM Computer 
Communication Review 39 (2009) 50-55. 
[2] Luis M. Vaquero, Luis Rodero-Merino, Rajkumar Buyya, Dynamically scaling 
applications in the cloud, ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review 
41(2011)45-52. 
[3] Eddy Carón, Frédéric Desprez, Adrián Muresan, Forecasting for grid and 
cloud computing on-demand resources based on pattern matching, in: IEEE, 
editor, Proceedings of the 2nd IEEE International Conference on Cloud 
Computing Technology and Science, CloudCom 2010, Indianapolis, Indiana, 
USA, November2010. Toappearas workin progress papertrack. 
[4] Rajkumar Buyya, David Abramson, Jonathan Giddy, Heinz Stockinger, 
Economic models for resource management and scheduling in grid computing, 
Concurre ncy and Computation: Practice and Experience 14 (2002) 1507-1542. 
[5] Aminul Haque, Saadat M. Alhashmi, Rajendran Parthiban, A survey of 
economic models ingrid computing, Future Generation Computer Systems 27 
(2011)1056-1069. 
[6] Rajkumar Buyya, Manzor Murshed, GridSim: a toolkit for the modeling and 
simulation of distributed resource management and scheduling for grid 
computing, Concurre ncy and Computation: Practice and Experience 14 (2002) 
1175-1220. 
[7] Eddy Carón, Frédéric Desprez, DIET: a scalable toolbox to build network 
enabled servers on the grid, High Performance Computing Applications 20 
(2006) 335-352. 
[8] Eddy Carón, Frédéric Desprez, David Loureiro, Adrián Muresan, Cloud 
computing resource management through a grid middleware: a case study 
with DIET and Eucalyptus, in: Proceedings of the 2nd IEEE International 
Conference on Cloud Computing, CIoud'09, IEEE, Bangalore, India, 2009, 
pp. 151-154. 
Rafael Moreno-Vozmediano, Rubén S. Montero, Ignacio M. Llórente, Elastic 
management of cluster-based services inthe cloud, in: Proceedings of the lst 
Workshop on Automated Control for Datacenters and Clouds, ICAC'09, ACM, 
Barcelona, Spain, 2009, pp. 19-24. 
[10] Daniel Nurmi, Rich Wolski, Chris Grzegorczyk, Graziano Obertelli, Sunil 
Soman, Lamia Youseff, Dmitrii Zagorodnov, The Eucalyptus open-source 
cloud-computing system, in: Proceedings of the 9th IEEE/ACM International 
Symposium on Cluster Computing and the Grid, CCGRID'09, IEEE, Shanghai, 
China, 2009, pp. 124-131. 
[11] Katarzyna Keahey, Mauricio Tsugawa, Andrea Matsunaga, José A.B. Fortes, Sky 
computing, Computer 13 (2009) 43-51. 
[12] Jeffrey Shneidman, Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, Alvin AuYoung, Alex C. Snoeren, 
Amin Vahdat, Brent Chun, Why markets could (but dont currently) solve 
resource allocation problems in system, in: Proceedings of the lOth Workshop 
on Hot Topics in Operating Systems, HotOS'05, USENIX, Santa Fe, USA, vol. 10, 
June 2005. 
[13] James Broberg, Srikumar Venugopal, Rajkumar Buyya, Market-oriented grids 
and utility computing: the state-of-the-art and future directions, Journal of 
Grid Computing 6 (3) (2008) 255-276. 
[14] B.N. Chun, P. Buonadonna, A. AuYoung, Chaki Ng, D.C. Parkes, J. Shneidman, 
A.C. Snoeren, A. Vahdat, Mirage: a microeconomic resource allocation system 
for sensornet testbeds, in: Proceedings of the 2nd IEEE Workshop on 
Embedded Networked Sensors, EmNetS05, IEEE, 2005, pp. 19-28. 
[151 Lusajo M. Minga, Yu-OJang Feng, Yi-Jun Li, Dynamic pricing: ecommerce-
oriented price setting algorithm, in: Proceedings of the 2nd International 
Conference on Machine Learning and Cibernetics, ICMLC 2003, vol. 2, 
November 2003, pp. 893-898. 
[16] Chee Shin Yeo, Rajkumar Buyya, Pricing for utility-driven resource manage-
ment and allocation in clusters, International Journal of High Performance 
Computing Applications 21 (4) (2007) 405-418. 
[171 Arutyun I. Avetisyan, Roy Campbell, Indranil Gupta, Michael T. Heath, Steven 
Y. Ko, Gregory R. Ganger, Michael A. Kozuch, David OHalIaron, Marcel Kunze, 
Thomas T. Kwan, Kevin Lai, Martha Lyons, Dejan S. Milojicic, Hing Yan Lee, 
Yeng Chai Soh, Ng Kwang Ming, Jing-Yuan Luke, Han Namgoong, Open cirrus: 
a global cloud computing testbed, Computer 43 (2010) 35-43. 
[181 Benny Rochwerger, David Breitgand, Eliezer Levy, Alex Galis, Kenneth Nagin, 
Ignacio M. Llórente, Rubén Montero, Yaron Wolfsthal, Erik Elmroth, Juan 
Cáceres, Muli Ben-Yehuda, Wolgang Emmerich, Fermín Galán, The Reservoir 
model and architecture for open federated cloud computing, IBM Journal of 
Research and Development 53 (4) (2009) 1-11. 
[19] Luis Rodero-Merino, Luis M. Vaquero, Víctor Gil, Javier Fontán, Fermín Galán, 
Rubén S. Montero, Ignacio M. Llórente, From infrastructure delivery to service 
management in clouds, Future Generation Computer Systems 26 (2010) 
1226-1240. 
[20] Rajkumar Buyya, Rajiv Ranjan, Rodrigo N. Calheiros, InterCloud: utility-
oriented federation of cloud computing environments for scaling of appli-
cation services, in: Proceedings of the lOth International Conference on 
Algorithms and Architectures for Parallel Processing, ICA3PP 2010, in: Lee-
ture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 6081, Springer, Busan, South Korea, 2010, 
pp. 13-31. 
[21] Shantenu Jha, Andre Merzky, Geoffrey Fox, Using clouds to provide grids with 
higher levéis of abstraction and explicit support forusage modes, Concurrency 
and Computation: Practice and Experience 21 (2009) 1087-1108. 
[22] Michael A. Murphy, Sebastien Goasguen, Virtual organization clusters: self-
provisioned clouds on the grid, Future Generation Computer Systems 26 
(2010)1271-1281. 
[23] Manuel Rodríguez, Daniel Tapiador, Javier Fontán, Eduardo Huedo, Rubén S. 
Montero, Ignacio M. Llórente, Dynamic provisioning of virtual clusters for 
grid computing, in: Proceedings of Euro-Par 2008 Workshops, 3rd Workshop 
on Virtualization in High-Performance Cluster and Grid Computing, VHPC'08, 
in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 5415, Springer, Las Palmas de Gran 
Canaria, Canarias, Spain, 2008, pp. 23-32. 
[24] Constantino Vázquez, Eduardo Huedoa, Rubén S. Montero, Ignacio M. Llórente, 
On the use of clouds for grid resource provisioning, Future Generation 
Computer Systems 27 (2011) 600-605. 
[25] Rajkumar Buyya, David Abramson, Srikumar Venugopal, The grid economy, 
Proceedings of the IEEE 93 (2005) 698-714. 
[26] Jahanzeb Sherwani, Nosheen Ali, Nausheen Lotia, Zahra Hayat, Rajkumar 
Buyya, Libra: a computational economy-based job scheduling system for 
clusters, Software Practice and Experience 34 (6) (2004) 573-590. 
[27] Rich Wolski, James S. Plank, Todd Bryan, John Brevik, G-commerce: market 
formulations controlling resource allocation on the computational grid, 
in: Proceedings of the 15th International Parallel and Distributed Processing 
Symposium, IPDPS2001, IEEE, 2007. 
[28] Alvin Auyoung, Brent N. Chun, Alex C. Snoeren, Amin Vahdat, Resource 
allocation in federated distributed computing infrastructures, in: Proceedings 
of the lst Workshop on Operating System and Architectural Support for the 
on demand IT InfraStructure, OASIS04, October 2004. 
[29] Kevin Lai, Lars Rasmusson, Eytan Adar, Li Zhang, Bernardo A. Huberman, 
Tycoon: an implementationof a distributed, market-based resource allocation 
system, Multiagent and Grid Systems 1 (3) (2005) 169-182. 
[30] Brent N. Chun, David E. Culler, User-centric performance analysis of market-
based cluster batch schedulers, in: Proceedings of the 2nd IEEE/ACM 
International Symposium on Cluster Computing and the Grid, CCGrid02, IEEE, 
2002, p. 30. 
[31] David E. Irwin, Laura E. Grit, Jeffrey S. Chase, Balancing risk and reward in 
a market-based task service, in: Proceedings of the 13th IEEE International 
Symposium on High Performance Distributed Computing, HPDC04, IEEE, 2004, 
pp. 160-169. 
[32] Florentina I. Popovici, John Wilkes, Profitable services in an uncertain world, 
in: Proceedings of the 2005 ACM/IEEE Conference on Supercomputing, SC05, 
IEEE, 2005, p. 36. 
[33] Alvin AuYoung, Laura Grit, Janet Wiener, John Wilkes, Service contraets and 
aggregate utility functions, in: Proceedings of the 2006 15th IEEE International 
Conference on High Performance Distributed Computing, HPDC06, IEEE, 2006, 
pp. 119-131. 
t i L. Rodero-Merino is a postdoctoral Researcher at IN-I RÍA (Avalon group, Laboratoire de l'Informatique du I Parallélisme) with Telefónica ICD. He graduated in Com-I puter Science at the University of Valladolid and re-I ceived his Ph.D. degree at University Rey Juan Carlos, I where he also worked as an Assistant Professor. Pre-I viously he had worked in the R&D área of Ericsson I Spain. He was a researcher at Telefónica R&D before join-I ing INRIA. His research interests include computer net-
I works, distributed systems, P2P systems, grid computing 
and cloud computing. See http://sites.google.com/site/ 
luisroderomerinowebpage for further information. 
Eddy Carón is an assistant professor at Ecole Nórmale 
Supérieure (Lyon) and holds a position with the GRAAL 
project (LIP laboratory, ENS). He received his Ph.D. in 
C.S. from University de Picardie Jules Verne in 2000 
and his HDR (Habiliation Diriger les Recherche) from 
the ENS in 2010. His research interests include scientific 
computing on parallel distributed memory machines, grid 
computing and cloud computing. He is involved in many 
program committees (HCW, ISPA...). He is co-chairofthe 
GridRPC working group in OGF. He is the co-funder and 
scientific consultant of SysFera (www.sysfera.com). See 
http://graal.ens-lyon.fr/~ecaron for further information. 
Adrián Muresan is a second year Ph.D. student at Ecole 
Nationale Superior in Lyon, France. His Ph.D. is focused on 
resource management in Cloud platforms. He has obtained 
a Masters Degree in Computer Science at the Technical 
University of Cluj-Napoca, Romanía in 2009. 
Frédéric Desprez is a director of research at INRIA and 
holds a position at LIP laboratory (ENS Lyon). He received 
his Ph.D. in C.S. from the Institut National Polytechnique 
de Grenoble in 1994 and his MS in C.S. from the ENS 
Lyon in 1990. His research interests include parallel al-
gorithms, scheduling for large scale distributed platforms, 
data management, and grid and cloud computing. See 
http://graal.enslyon.fr/~desprez/ for further information. 
